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1. The Traditional Paradigm
Underlying "Animal" Experimentation

Alyssa V. Boss
The traditional paradigm is based on a pseudo-scientific,
anthropocentric, religious worldview which fails to
stand up under philosophical and scientific scrutiny. It
is based on the premise that there is a distinct line
separating humans and other animals. Because of this,
it is perfectly acceptable and even, according to some,
morally required to use other animals in experiments
to benefit humans or increase our knowledge.
The traditional paradigm forms the basis of the
current approach to biological science, or what Kuhn
calls "normal science." The term "normal science"
refers to "research firmly based upon one or more past
scientific achievements, achievements that some
particular scientific community acknowledges for a lime
as supplying the foundation for its further practice."3
The purpose of education and textbooks is not to
question or even explicate the basic paradigm, but to
explain the accepted theories of normal science and to
illustrate the successful application of these theories.
In this way, the traditional paradigm is passed on to
future generations of scientists. Only those who are
willing to work within the accepted paradigm are
welcome to participate in the community of scientists.
Those who question the paradigm of "normal science"
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An estimated 70 to 120 million nonhuman animals are
killed every year in scientific experiments. l The
justifications for the use of nonhuman animals in
scientific experiments to benefit humans are based on
two conflicting paradigms or models regarding the
nature of human and nonhuman animals. This paper
will trace the origins of these competing paradigms and
the assumptions underlying each of them as they relate
to scientific research.
According to Thomas Kuhn, in his landmark work
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, when there
are two competing and incompatible paradigms, one
of them has eventually to give way to the other. 2
Scientific revolutions, by their very nature, involve
a shift from an old or traditional paradigm to a new
paradigm. A paradigm shift, we wiU argue, is
presently taking place in tlle biological sciences. The
effect of this shift is currently being experienced in
the conflict and uncertainty over what policies to
adopt regarding the use of nonhuman animals In
scientific experiments.

Summer & Fall 1994

PHILOSOPHY

119

Between the Species

Paradigm Sh!fls. ScicnlUic R('\('!lIli,'/ls 'II/d lli(

,\1(1/<11

.lIlSIiI/,·<lli,JI/ (~I /-"1!'(/lII101l11l/1>1I

or refuse to accept it must either work in isolation or
join a fringe group.
The traditional paradigm regarding "animal"
experimentation was heavily influenced by the Greek
philosophers, such as Aristotle, who argued that reason
is an activity of the soul. Only the soul, which is nonmaterial and hence not restricted by the laws of nature,
can act freely. Humans have a soul; nonhuman animals
don't. This paradigm, which was Christianized by
Thomas Aquinas, foons the basis of what is referred to
as "traditional morality"-the notion that only humans
have intrinsic moral value. This philosophical tradition
has been one of the most deeply rooted obstacles to
serious consideration of the rights of nonhuman animals.
According to the Westem Christian/philosophical
worldview, the universe was created by God primarily
as a home for humans, who were made in "His" image.
The earth and all the creatures and other natural resources
on the earth were put here by God to provide for human
needs. Because of their special creation, humans alone
among creatures partake of both the spiritual and
material realms and, therefore, have a radically different
nature that sets them apart from other animals.
"Humans," according to Thomas Aquinas, "are the
highest in the order of material beings, yet the lowest
in the order of spiritual beings... the progression from
the non-living to humans is one of increasing
perfection ... schematically, humans are at the apex of
material creation."4 Because we bear the closest likeness
to God, humans are "highest" among creatures, and
other animals and "things" are located on the scale
depending on their resemblance to humans. Because
animals are "dumb," to use Aquinas's teon, and lack a
soul, "it is not wrong for man to make use of them,
either by killing or in any other way whatever."s
Environmentalist Lynn White maintains that
Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the
world has ever seen. "By destroying pagan animism,
Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood
of indifference to the feelings of natural objects."6 The
Westem belief that humans are separate from nature
and have dominion over nature, he maintains, has
enabled technological advance at the expense of nature
and other animals.
This hierarchical model of the natural order has also
been used to justify a hierarchy among different groups
of humans, depending on their perceived level of
rational activity. Thus, acceptance of the traditional
paradigm hal) perpetuated not only the exploitation of
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nonhuman animals as experimental subjects but
discrimination, in scientific and medical research as well
as society at large, against women and people of color.
Again, the male is by nature superior, and the
female inferior... Where there is such a
difference as that between soul and body, or
between men and animals, the lower sort are
by nature slaves, and it is better for them as
for all inferiors that they should be under the
rule of a master. .. indeed the use made of slaves
and of tame animals is not very different.?
With only a few notable exceptions, modem Westem
philosophers have simply accepted anthropocentrism
and the privileged status of humans, and men in
particular, as a matter of fact. Rene Descartes, who is
acknowledged to be the "Father of Modem Philosophy,"
wrote in his Discourse on Method (1637) that the
rational soul could not be in any way derived from
matter and that, therefore, the soul or mind is in its nature
entirely independent of body. Humans are a combination
ofmindlsoul and body, while animals are entirely body
and, hence, are merely machines. Even though he
conceded that some nonhuman animals are capable of
deceiving the shrewdest humans, Descartes did not take
this to mean that they have thoughts. Instead, he
regarded it is as proof that nonhuman animals act
naturally and mechanically, like a clock which is able
to give a more accurate reading of the time than is
human judgment.
Descartes' philosophy heralded the beginning of the
scientific revolution. However, despite his underlying
epistemological principle that one must question
everything, he did not question the paradigm underlying
traditional morality but simply disguised the old
religious language in more scientifically acceptable
language. TIle immaterial soul is recast as disembodied
intellect; science and technology now become the God;
and humans are again given dominion over the earth
by the new God-Science. By driving a wedge between
human beings as disembodied intellects and other
creatures as pure matter, Cartesian dualism permits
humans to act as though other animals are simply
"inanimate" resources to be used as we like.
Legitimating the traditional dualistic paradigm as the
foundation of modern science was taken one step further
by Descartes' contemporary Francis Bacon, one of the
founders of the scientific mcUlod. While claiming UUlt
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the scientific method has no religious or moral
significance, Bacon at the same time unquestionably
accepted the worldview that humans have the right and
even the duty to manipulate nature and use other animals
to satisfy human needs. Indeed, Bacon enthusiastically
advocated vivisection for the purejoy oflearning, without
need of any moral justification, such as saving human
lives. Because of the tremendous success of the scientific
method in generating results and new technologies, and
because of its claim to be value-neutral, few people
bothered to question the moral and metaphysical
assumptions underlying the scientific method.
Because it assumes a profound separation between
intellect and body, the traditional paradigm has also
resulted in free rein to express our intellect while
simultaneously degrading and stifling emotions and
instincts. Sigmund Freud, who incorporated the
assumptions of this paradigm into psychoanalytic
theory, maintained that in order for human civilization
to succeed, instincts much be brought under control by
the mind. 8 Thus scientists, who are called to be
disembodied intellects in the service of science,
gradually became numb to the massive suffering of the
nonhuman animals used in their experimeIlts while at
the same time being rewarded for seeking knowledge
for knowledge's sake. "This rational, detached,
scientific intellect, observing a world of which it is no
longer a part," environmentalist and U.S. Vice President
Al Gore notes, "is too often arrogant, unfeeling,
uncaring. And its consequences can be monstrous."9
Even the modern existentialists, who rejected much
of traditional philosophy and ethics, and condemned
the negative effects of modern science and technology
on the human psyche, simply accepted without question
traditional anthropocentric thinking. In a line of
reasoning that sounds suspiciously reminiscent of
Aquinas' and Descartes' mind/body dualism, Sartre
argued that while other animals are born with an essence
or nature, humans-being free and rational beingsare nothing but what they make of themselves. In other
words, with hmnans "existence precedes essence," while
with all other animals "essence precedes existence."lO
Once again the disembodied rational intellect won out
over emotions and instincts which were seen as nothing
but functions of a mechanistic animal body.
This prejudice against nonhuman animals has been
promoted by both Western theologians and philosophers
who regard evil as something alien to the soul.
Animals-as well as women cU1d people of color who
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are regarded as less rational and more "instinctive" and
emotional than white males-have been used as
symbols of evil in the Western world ever since the
serpent tempted Eve in the Garden of Eden. Animal
welfare philosopher Mary Midgely notes that any evil
on the part of humans is interpreted as "the debasing
effect of matter seeping in through instinctive nature.
This treacherous element clearly cannot be anything
properly human; it must be described in animal terms.
And no particular animal at that. .. In short, the Beast
Within, whose only opponent is the rational soul."l1
Nonhuman animals are typically portrayed as
chaotic, uncontrolled and unpredictable, while humans
are seen as rational and in control. Oddly, nonhuman
animals, under the traditional paradigm, are at the same
time held to have the exact opposite nature. They are
machine-like and tlleir behavior rigid, predetermined
and governed by instincts. This prejudice is also
maintained through language that degrades members
of other species; he's an animal, a beast, a rat, a swine;
she's catty, mousey, a bitch, a bird-brain. To act
humanely, on the other hand, is to be kind and noble.
To be a man is to show courage. Because of the
assumption that everything other animals do is evil or
inferior at best, it is concluded that it is morally
justifiable to restrain them, to impose order on them,
and to treat tllem as objects to be disposed of and
experimented upon for the benefit of humans.
2. Challenges to the Traditional Paradigm
Challenges to the traditional paradigm have come from
several fronts including Galileo's discovery that the
earth is not the center of the universe, Darwinian
evolutionary theory, Piaget's finding that logical thought
can occur without language, concern for the rights of
human subjects following the holocaust of World War
II, the civil rights movement, and the environmental
movement. The increasing evidence of irrational human
brutality, and the alarming acceleration in the past few
decades of environmental destruction because of human
activities, including the extinction of thousands of
species of plants and animals every year, has caused
many people to rethink the traditional paradigm and to
realize that humans are not separate from nature but a
part of nature. It is becoming apparent, as we stand on
tlle brink of ecological disaster, tllat it is the human
animal, more tllan any otller, tllat needs to be restrained
and have order imposed on it.
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The assumption that the universe was created by
God for human use was first called into question by
Galileo's discovery in 1610 that the earth is not the
center of the universe but just another celestial body, a
theory which had already been proposed by Copernicus
in 1543. As a result of his discovery, Galileo was
charged by the authorities with subversion and heresy.
Under pressure from the Church, he pleaded that he
didn't really accept the implications of his discovery.
With Galileo sufficiently subdued, the traditional
paradigm based on the assumption that humans hold a
special place in creation continued as the predominant
worldview and the keystone of traditional morality.
The traditional paradigm suffered a further and more
serious blow 250 years later with the publication of
Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859.
Although Darwin had already formulated his theory in
1838, he was reluctant to publish the results. When the
book was finally published, it was met with much public
scorn as well as censure from the church. According to
Darwin's theory of evolution, differences between
humans and nonhuman animals were merely differences
of degree rather than kind. In his later book, The Descent
ofMan, Darwin argued against the notion that humans
differ greatly from "animals" because of humans'
mental powers, pointing out that there is no fundamental
difference between man and the higher animals in their
mental faculties. Rather than being a unique and special
creation, humans evolved from the same ancestors as
the other animals. According to Kuhn,

organisms that resemble one another in some ways
and not in others. Even within a species, some
organisms are better adapted and more sentient than
others. Consequently, moral treaLment should depend
on the individual qualities rather than an outdated
notion like species' essence.
Darwin particularly attacked the assumption that
only humans are capable of reason. Reasoning by
definition involves the ability to form general rules from
particular experiences. That other animals are clearly
capable ofreasoning seemed obvious to Darwin as well
as to some of the other naturalists of his time. "Of all
the faculties of the human mind," he wrote in his book

The Descent ofMan,
it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason
stands at the summit. Only a few persons now
dispute that animals possess some power of
reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen
to pause, deliberate, and resolve. It is a
significant fact, that the more the habits of
any particular animal are studied by a
naturalist, the more he attributes to reason and
the less to unlearnt instincts. 13
Unfortunately, Darwin underestimated the power of
the traditional paradigm in preventing humans from
seeing rationality in other animals. The belief that
nonhuman animals are unable to reason, and hence to
make choices or act freely, was for a long time supported
not only by religious doctrine but also by the belief that
language is necessary for the formation of concepts
which are, in tum, necessary for reason. Descartes, for
example, argued that because animals lacked speech,
i.e., were "dumb," a tenn which has come to mean both
mute and stupid, this showed "not merely that the brutes
have less reason than men, but that they have none at
all, since it is clear that very little is required in order to
be able to talk."14 Therefore, according to Descartes,
animals are forever trapped in the momentary.
Much of the success of nonnal science, according
to Kuhn, lies in its ability to defend its basic
assumptions, sometimes at considerable cost, and to
suppress new findings that are seen as subversive and
not consistent with it's basic worldview or paradigm. IS
Normal science also defines which problems or
phenomena should be studied. Kuhn writes: "Perhaps
the most striking feature of the normal research
problems we have just encountered is how little they

For many men the abolition of the teleological
kind of evolution was the most significant and
least palatable of Darwin's suggestions. The
Origin of!'Jpecies recognized no goal set either
by God or nature. Instead, natural selection
was responsible for the gradual but steady
emergence of more elaborate... specialized
organisms which were products of a process
that moved steadily from primitive beginnings
but toward no goal... What could "evolution,"
"development" and "progress" mean in the
absence of a specified goal?12
In other words, if humans are the result of natural
forces without a plan or purpose, then how can one
justify a moral theory based on the superiority of
human nature? If we accept evolutionary biology, then
there are no fixed essences but a multitude of
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aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or
phenomenal."16 In line WiUI this, it is amazing how the
assumption which equates mental concepts with
language has gone unchallenged for so long.
Non-linguistic tllinking is a field iliat has barely
begun to be explored by science despite overwhelming
evidence for its existence. The hidden cost of
maintaining iliis assumption, which is basic to ilie
traditional paradigm, is widespread discrimination
against small children as well as nonhuman animals.
While it is true that spoken language or a set of
conventional signs is a fundamental tool for ilie adult
human's mental life and formation of concepts, one
cannot conclude from this iliat language is essential for
a mental life. In fact, children under ilie age of one or
two clearly have a mental life. Yet they lack language. ""
Prior to this century, infants and young children, like
other animals, were believed to be devoid of a mental
or cognitive life and, hence, intrinsic moral value. 17
However, child psychologist Jean Piaget found iliat
instead of infants being passive and devoid of iliought,
tlle most rapid cognitive growili and learning in humans
occurs prior to ilie age of two - and prior to language
acquisition. 18 Indeed, any argument iliatdenies any sort
of significant thought in the absence of language would
find it difficult to explain how humans ever acquire
language in the first place.
Many nonhuman animals are likewise clearly
capable of reasoning and remembering. If iliey were
not, it would be pointless to use them as subjects in
learning experiments. Nonhuman animals obviously
have concepts of food and danger, and iliey show
evidence of having expectations of future events, such
as rewards and punishments. A recent article in
Scientific American states that "computers have
mastered intellectual tasks such as chess and integral
logic, but tlley have yet to attain ilie skills of a lobster
in dealing wiili ilie real world." 19
Behavioral evidence also supports ilie claim iliat
other animals, like young humans, have memory
witllOUt language. And memory depends on concept
formation. Because we don't know how otller animals
do tllis without a system of conventional symbols does
not mean tllat tlley don't do it. To use an analogy, if we
adopted an orniiliocentric or bird-centered worldview,
we might claim tlmt flying stands at ilie summit of all
other achievements. Because all birds need feailiers in
order to fly. we might conclude tllat feailiers are essential
for flying. However, iliis is clearly false, since bats and
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butterflies and airplanes are also capable of flying. Of
course, we are readily able to admit that non-birds are
capable of flying, since our perception is not shaped
by an ornithocentric worldview. However, if it were,
we would probably devise all oilier sorts of other
ilieories that are compatible with our paradigm to
"explain" what these oilier beings are doing in ilie air
wiiliout actually flying.
The claim that only humans are self-conscious or
have a concept of self is also hard, if not impossible,
to substantiate scientifically. The same criteria that we
use in concluding that other humans are selfconscious-the formation and use of concepts, the
realization iliat a particular experience is happening to
them, the ability to learn from ilieir experience, ilie
efforts to protect themselves from harm-all point to
the presence of self-consciousness in oilier animals.
However, when scientists do try to apply the same
criteria to humans and nonhuman animals, their
observations are discounted amid accusations of
anthropomorphism-one of ilie cardinal sins of normal
science. In iliis way, traditional science avoids having
to confront its anthropocentric assumptions by engaging
in circular reasoning.
If nonhuman animals are incapable of making
decisions or choices based on reason, they would be
useless in learning experiments. "If we refuse to
impute mental processes to oilier animals," notes
philosopher and animal liberation advocate Peter
Singer, "the logical consequence of this view of
'scientific methods' is iliat experiments on animals
cannot teach us anything about human beings. As
amazing as it may seem, some psychologists have been
so concerned to avoid anthropomorphism that iliey have
accepted tllis conclusion. "20
TIlliS, applying ilie traditional paradigm of "normal
science" to scientific experimentation on nonhuman
animals involves accepting contradictory premises: iliat
other animals are fundamentally different from humans
and iliat oilier animals are enough like humans that we
can use tllem in research to make relatively accurate
generalizations about human physiology and leanling.
This flaw in ilie old paradigm is becoming increasingly
apparent with the rapid groWtll of ilie animal liberation
and animal welfare movements in the past few decades.
One of the means of maintaining a paradigm,
according to Kuhn, is through language. For example,
in ilie traditional paradigm tlle term "animal" is used,
incorrectly, to refer to only "nonhuman animals"-ilie
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term used by members of the animal liberation and
animal welfare movements. The tenus "sacrifice" or
"tennination" are used by adherents of "normal science"
and the traditional paradigm when talking about
"laboratory animals," rather than "euthanasia" or
"killing"-tenus reserved for the death of a human or
a "pet." Different language is also used to describe the
behavior of humans and nonhuman animals. However,
the fact that the same response or behavior is described
with behavioristic, mechanistic tenus when speaking
of nonhuman animals but with psychological mental
tenus or fuzzy philosophical tenns such as "free will"
when describing the same response or behavior in
humans does not mean that the two are in fact different.
Another challenge to the traditional paradigm came
through changes in our attitudes regarding the use of
non-consenting humans in non-therapeutic experiments.
Prior to World War 11, there were very few regulations
regarding the use of human subjects in scientific
experiments. Following the war, with the growing
public awareness ofthe atrocities committed in the name
of science in the Nazi concentration camps, the
traditional immunity of science from ethical scrutiny
began to erode. Other studies conducted in this country,
such as the Tuskegee syphilis study, the experiments
on mentally retarded children at Willowbrook and the
elderly at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, and the
use of prisoners as subjects in medical experimentsall studies which were regarded as morally acceptable
by the scientific establishment at the time-were also
publicly criticized.
As a result of this growing public awareness, strict
regulations regarding human experimentation have been
put in place to prevent the use in scientific experiments
of humans lacking the cognitive or political power to
assert their rights. The conviction that it is wrong to
perform experiments on mentally defective, imprisoned
or similarly marginalized humans has fueled the similar
conviction that it is wrong and contrary to the principle
of justice to do the same to other animals.
The impassioned battle for equal rights for all groups
of humans during the various civil rights movcmcnts
also fueled a demand for respect for the rights of other
animals as well. The principle of equality among
humans is not based on an empirical description of
actual equality of humans but upon a moral ideal of
equal concern for the well-being of others. An
implication of this concem is that equal respect should
apply to all beings regardless of their particular abilities,
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their intelligence or social standing. Indeed, many
people who were engaged in the movements for equal
rights for humans, such as Mallatma Gandhi, Mary
Wollstonecraft, Lord Shaftesbury, Susan B. Anthony,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Horace Greeley, to name
only a few, were also involved in the animals rights
movement. 21 These people in tum, and in particular
Gandhi who was adanlantly opposed to the exploitation
of nonhuman animals, had a large impact on the
American Civil Rights movement of the 1960's.
Gandhi's basic philosophy centered on the interconnectedness of all life and the importance of
extending moral respect to all living beings if we are to
ever have a peaceful world.

3. Making the Shift
Because of the heavy investment of traditional scientists
in a particular paradigm, scientific revolutions rarely
occur overnight or even in a single generation. This is
especially true in areas of science which are insulated
from the general public and whose publications are
primarily in journals geared only toward others in the
field or related fields. In the early stages of the
development of a new paradigm, attention tends to be
focused on the development of new alternatives. 21
The emergence of a new paradigm from competing
alternatives, according to Kuhn, is generally "preceded
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or accompanied by fundamental philosophical analysis
of the contemporary research tradition."23 In light of
this observation, it should come as no surprise that many
of the leaders of the animal rights movement are social
reformers, philosophers and ethicists who came from
outside of normal science.
Paradigm shifts generally occur when a new
paradigm eventually gains enough adherents to make
their voice heard. Since 1980, the membership of
animal protection groups, while still representing a
minority of the population, has increased five to
tenfold. 24 Supporters of a new paradigm are generally
members of the laity or restricted to a narrow
subdivision, generally newcomers, of the scientific
community who are not committed to the traditional
rules of normal science.
The Animal Welfare Act, which was fIrst enacted in
1970 and has since undergone many amendments, acts
as a bridge between the traditional anthropocentric
paradigm and the new emerging paradigm. While the
Act neither accepts equal rights for nonhuman animals
used as subjects in experiments, nor granlS the same
protection to "laboratory animals" as it does to cats, dogs
and primates, it requires that researchers at least respect
certain welfare rights and interests of their subjects.
Paradigm shifts are more likely to occur during a
time of crisis, when normal science is unable to solve
a particular problem. The threat of global ecological
disaster, while still denied by many scientists, may be
such a crisis. As such it requires that humans, a5 a
species, reassess their relationship to the earth as well
as to their technology. New paradigms require that
people see the world, including other species of
animals, in a radically new way. This means a complete
re-evaluation of the traditional anthropocentric
morality which allows us to exploit other animals and
the environment. Because the use of "animal" research
in the scientific and medical research community is
so thoroughly entrenched, there is tremendous
resistance to doing so.
When a paradigm shift occurs, there is inevitably
conflict and heated debate a5 the two competing views
openly clash. When a paradigm shift occurs, some of
the old problems that were considered trivial or nonexistent, such as the morally significant difference
between humans and other animals and the rights and
welfare of nonhuman animals and the environment,
become the "very archetypes of significant scientific
advancement."25
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According to Kuhn, "normal science--that put forth
in traditional textbooks-often suppresses fundamental
novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its
basic commitments."26 One of the present commitments
is to the use of nonhuman animals in scientifIc research.
"Once a pattern of animal experimentation becomes the
accepted mode of research in a particular field," Singer
notes, "The process is self-reinforcing and difficult to
break."n A whole system of rewards, including tenure,
the award of research grants, publication and scientifIc
achievement, is invested in acceptance of the traditional
paradigm. For this reason, arguments in support of
animal research ba5ed on the benefits derived from it
are essentially unresolvable. Even if valuable
discoveries have been made using nonhuman animals,
we cannot say how successful medical and scientific
research would have been if it had been compelled, from
the beginning, to develop alternative methods of
investigation or if it had addressed itself to a different
set of medical problems, such as preventive medicine
or world health or environmentally-related issues.
Regarding the moral assumptions underlying
scientific research, philosopher James Rachels
maintains that we have reached that point in the
paradigm shift where the old traditional morality needs
to give way to a new ethics based on moral individualism in which species or group membership is
relatively unimportant.
What has made it pressing is not simply a
faddish interest taken by philosophers in
animals' welfare or animal rights. Rather, it is
an issue pressed upon us by the disintegration
of the pre-Darwinian way of understanding
nature. The ... final step of the historical
process will be reached if and when a new
equilibrium is found in which our morality can
once again comfortably coexist with our
understanding of the world and our place in it.28
Kuhn points out that when scientists and other
people who are heavily invested in a particular paradigm
are confronted with an anomaly, they will "devise
numerous articulation and ad hoc modifIcations of their
theory in order to eliminate any apparent confIict."29
For example, religious organizations, 'who have
traditionally been guardians of the anthropocentric
morality that underlies the traditional paradigm, have
become increasingly involved in the environmental
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movement. This, however, places churches in the
uncomfortable position of being accused of being one
of the primary causes of the current crisis by condoning
exploitation of the earth's resources for human
advancement, while at the same time trying to promote
themselves as the beneficent caretakers of the earth.
In response to these accusations, Christian
apologists, such as Al Gore, argue that the correct
interpretation of Biblical Christianity is that humans,
rather than dominating nature, are called upon to be
"stewards" of the earth. 30 However, this is simply a
rewording of the traditional paradigm rather than a real
shift. The concept of "stewardship" still implies that
humans have privileged status vis-a-vis the rest of
animals and nature. The paternalism implicit in the
stewardship model reduces other animals to being
permanently childlike and incapable of caring for
themselves without our guidance and control. Also, the
stewardship model is still focused on caring for the earth
so that future generations of humans may benefit from
its resources rather than on genuine respect for other
living beings. Given the heavy investment most
religious organizations have in the traditional
anthropocentric paradigm, it is not surprising that they
have been silent for the most part on the issue of the
exploitation of nonhuman animals in scientific research
to benefit humans.
Another more radical alternative paradigm has been
put forth by feminist theologians, such as Sallie
McFague, author of The Body of God: An Ecological
Theology (1993). Using the Big Bang theory as support
for the unity and common source of all being, the
universe is envisioned in this paradigm as the incarnated body of God, rather than as being separate from
and the creation of a transcendent, disembodied God.
While the implications of this paradigm have yet to
be worked out by its proponents, it would seem to
require us to acknowledge the divinity and intrinsic
moral worth of all beings, including laboratory
animals, rather than just humans.
The strategy of making ad hoc modifications in
theories in order to avoid conflict or having to give up
the traditional paradigm also occurs among scientists.
For example, R.G. Frey and W. Paton, defenders of the
use of nonhuman animals in scientific experiments,
admit that equality in tenns of life and interests of some
humans and some nonhuman animals is a problem that
needs to be taken more seriously when designing
experiments. According to the principle of justice,
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"When individuals are treated differently, we need to
point to a difference between them that justifies the
differences in treatmenl."31 Mere difference in species
is not enough to justify differences in treatment by
scientists any more than is mere difference in group
membership sufficient to justify paying a woman or an
African-American less or denying them a job. To
discriminate solely on the bases of gender or race
constitutes sexism or racism. To discriminate solely on
the basis of species constitutes what Singer terms
"speciesism." Singer's rule of thumb for avoiding
speciesism is that "we should give the same respect to
the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those
humans at a similar mentallevel."32
Applying this rule to animal experimentation, Frey
and Paton observe that:
We do not do to defective humans all that we
presently do in our laboratories to quite healthy
animals. My interest is in why we do not. If
the justification is that we think human life of
greater value than animals' life, then we must
be prepared to face the facts, at least on the
grounds I suggested, that (1) not all human
life is of the same value and (ii) some human
life has a value so low as to be exceeded by
some animallife. 33
However, rather that relinquish the traditional paradigm,
Frey and Paton conclude that, in accordance with the
principle ofjustice as explicated by Singer and Rachels,
experimentation on healthy sentient mammals also
justifies similar experimentation on human with similar
or lower capacities.
One of the weaknesses of the alternative based on
this version of the principle of justice is that it is still
basically anthropocentric in that it respects nonhuman
life only to the extent that it resembles sentient human
life. Indeed, Singer limits his opposition to scientific
experimentation using nonhuman animals primarily to
those done on mammals.
Another alternative paradigm is that based on rights
ethics rather than the principle of justice. Traditional
morality supports a model of rights based on selfassertion. The model ofrights adopted by most civil rights
and animals rights activists, on the other hand, is based
on interests. According to the self-assertion model, a right
"is a claim, or potential claim, that one party may exercise
against another. Rights arise, and can be intelligibly
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in avoiding harm and suffering. Beings, however, have
a right to pursue only their legitimate interests-that
is, those interests that do not prevent others from
pursuing their similar interests. Under this model of
rights, benefits to oneself and others are morally
acceptable only if no one else's rights have been violated
in achieving these benefits. For example, we can't
sacrifice the life of one child in a medical experiment
to save the lives of fifty others.
Not all animals have the same interests. There are
distinctly human rights, such as the right to religious
freedom and the right to a formal education, that other
animals lack since they have no interest in organized
religion or fonnal schooling. On the other hand, all
sentient animals, including humans, cats and mice, have
an interest in not being tortured, not because they are
capable of rational thought., but because they have the
capacity to feel pain. In recognition of this, the Animal
Welfare Act prohibits experiments that cause
nonhumans animals unnecessary pain.
The need for one's space also does not ground a
distinctive human right but one belonging to all
territorial animals. Property or territorial rights belong
to more than just humans since squirrels and mice and
many other animals also need property or territory for
collecting food and raising their young. This right is
recognized and minimally respected in the Animal
Welfare Act and its amendments regulating minimum
space requirements for different "laboratory animals,"
so called. The Animal Welfare Act also expects
experimenters to respect animals' interests in health
care, proper nutrition and a clean living space. However,
it does not recognize their liberty rights or right to life.
Rachels notes in this regard that

defended, only among beings who actually do, or can,
make moral claims against one another."34 This model,
which is steeped in traditional dualistic ethics, assumes
that only humans have rights, since "nonhuman animals
lack this capacity for moral choice."35
However, this description of human and nonhuman
animals is inaccurate. Many nonhuman animals, as well
as small children, respond with indignation, which is
anger at an injustice, when their interests or needs are
ignored or thwarted. They certainly seem to be
recognizing and responding to moral claims. Another
problem with this concept of rights is that we do
recognize and protect, though not to the same extent
tlmt we protect the rights of adults,36 tlle rights of small
children and humans with severe brain damage despite
the fact that they are not generally recognized as being
capable of free moral judgment., and in some cases have
no potential for rationality.
Under the self-assertion model of rights, being able
to claim one's rights boils down to having the power,
generally political power, to successfully assert oneself.
Basing rights on one's power to assert oneself, or the
presence of an effective agent who will act on one's
behalf, allows us to disregard not only the rights of
nonhuman animals but also the rights of disempowered
groups of humans who lack the political power or force
of law to exercise their moral claims.
Philosophical concepts and the paradigms they
support do not exist in a vacuum but have real-life
consequences. lllis model of rights ha<; contributed to
the belief that humans in positions of power, such as
scientists and medical doctors, have the right to assert
their power over and exploit other species of animals
in the name of science with little concern for their
welfare, and in ways that would be considered as cruel
and immoral if done by someone in a lesser position of
power. Indeed, as was pointed out earlier, this model of
rights was used at one time to justify the use in scientific
experiments, without their informed consent, of groups
of people who lacked political power.
The second model of rights, which is part of a newly
emerging non-anthropocentric paradigm, is based on
the principle of equal consideration of interests. The
existence of interests is based on the capacity for
suffering and for enjoyment. Humans are seen as
members of a wider animal community, or a web of
life, rather than as being a special and unique creation.
All sentient animals, including humans, have an interest
in doing that which brings pleasure as well as an interest
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While it is generally acknowledged by
philosophers that liberty and freedom from
coercion are essential if we humans are to
develop and lead the types of lives where we
can exercise our powers as rational agents, it
is also true that liberty is necessary for many
nonhuman animals if they are to live the sorts
of lives, and thrive, in ways that are natural
to them. 3?
Injustifying the conscription of nonhuman animals
for scientific experiments, the argument that humans
can only be used if they give their informed consent,
but other animals can be used because they are incapable
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of giving infonned consent, is simply illogical and a
good candidate for doublethink. Because other animals
have an interest in liberty, field experiments are morally
preferable to ones where animals are held captive in
laboratories or where there is insufficient space for them
to pursue their interests.
Despite the claims of those who adhere to the
traditional paradigm, which assigns moral value based
on the possession of autonomy and rationality, the moral
relevance of sentience, rather than intelligence, is
recognized in the prohibition against the use of severely
mentally retarded humans in painful non-therapeutic
medical research. However, if a higher degree of
intelligence does not justify one human using another
merely sentient human in scientific research, without
their consent, then how can it entitle humans to exploit
sentient nonhuman animals for the same purpose?
The clash between competing paradigms can result
in deep chasms and misunderstandings between the
factions because of the difference in basic assumptions
and the different use of key tenns. It is a terrible thing
when someone, especially people who are not directly
involved in the field under attack, accuse scientists of
having dedicated their whole lives to pursuing a cruel
and immoral vocation. We believe that all of us desire, at
least at some level, to do what is right and good. People
who claim that "animal" researchers are intentionally
cruel are simply mistaken, except perhaps in a few
idiosyncratic cases. In the great majority of cases,
scientists using nonhuman animals in tlleir research have
motives which are noble and aimed at benefiting humans.
At the same time, we can all improve. Martin Luther
King, Jr. once said that the "Universe bends toward
justice." There are times in all our lives when, upon
reflection, we realize that the end does not always justify
the means and that we can do better in making this a
more compassionate and just world.

scientific altematives to the use of animals in research,"
Tom Regan contends, "are captives of mental habits
that science abhors."38 Rather than stopping all research,
scientists are now being called by the newly emerging
paradigm and the new ethics to redirect their practice
from using nonhuman animals toward using more just
altemative methods of scientific research.
The current paradigm shift is marked by a growing
interest in the topic of alternatives to research using
nonhuman animals. The concept of altematives was
developed by two British scientists, W.M. Russell and
L.R. Burch, in 1959 and involves the principle of the
"Three R's"; Replacement, Reduction and Refinement.
The first "R," replacement, refers to situations where
techniques, such as mathematical and computer models
and tissue cultures, can be substituted for those using
nonhuman animals. Also, in some cases, infonned,
consenting humans subjects could be used in place of
nonhuman subjects. For example, there is no shortage
of people with AIDS who would like to volunteer to be
subjects in experiments designed to find a cure for
AIDS.39 The fact that it might be less convenient to
carry out research on humans instead of captive animals
.does not in itselfjustify using nonhuman animals. When
alternative, morally acceptable techniques are available,
they ought to be used.
Reduction refers to cutting back, whenever possible,
on the number of nonhuman animals used in
experiments. This involves the elimination of
experiments that test trivial hypotheses or hypotheses
whose truth or falsity is already sufficiently established,
poorly designed experiments, and the use of nonhuman
animals in experiments for duplication of drugs by
competing firms. When nonhuman animals are used,
the minimum number necessary for results should be
used. For example, the National Cancer Institute in the
course of only a few years has reduced the number of
rodents used in cancerresearch by 80-90%. The Institute
is switching to the use of cell culture screening systems
which are turning out to work better than the standard
nonhuman animal model systems. 40
The third "R," refinement, refers to the modification of techniques to reduce the pain and distress
suffered by laboratory animals. In line with this, animal
welfare legislation now requires that principle
investigators minimize animal pain and distress in their
research projects.
We would also like to add a fourth "R": Respect.
The experimental design should be compatible with

4. Seeking Viable Alternatives
The claim that putting an end to all or most research
using nonhuman animals would bring scientific
progress to a halt is surely an exaggeration, as well as
an indication of how some scientists are unable to see
beyond the old paradigm. In fact, it was not too long
ago that some scientists felt that the use of human
subjects, without their consent, was necessary for
scientific progress. Similarly, "those scientists who have
convinced themselves that there can't be viable
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respect, not only for nonhuman animal subjects, but
also, if you are a user, for yourself as a researcher. Do
you feel you are compromising your own moral dignity
or that of those who work with you by participating in
this experiment? Using captive animals places the
experimenter in a position of superiority. When we hold
a position of power over others-humans or nonhuman
animals-this often turns into contempt for those we
have power over, as well as a numbing toward their
suffering. In experimentation using nonhuman animals,
this contempt might be exhibited not only in a debased
attitude toward "laboratory animals" but toward
nonhuman animals in general.
A last question to ask is whether the experimental
design can pass the test of publicity. The test of publicity
states that we should do only those actions which a
reasonable person or persons would deem morally
acceptable. How do others, especially tllOse new to the
field or outside the field, respond to the experiment?
Young children especially, have not yet been socialized
in the traditional paradigm which teaches them to regard
other animals as "things." Consequently, they often
develop close relationships with members of other
species such as a cat or dog. Would you feel good about
using one of your childhood animal companions in your
experiment? If not, why not?
Philosopher David Hume believed that although
reason may inform our moral decisions, it is sentiment
or feeling that actually moves us to act on these
decisions. 41 In deciding whether it is morally acceptable
to use nonhuman animals in your particular experiment,
you should listen to others---especially young people
and otllers who are not so heavily invested in the old
traditional paradigm; then listen to your own heart.

among scientists, that humans as a group have a
privileged, partly divine nature or essence, while other
animals are qualitatively different. Darwinian
evolutionary biology, on the oilier hand, implies
something very different.
The anthropocentric religious worldview began
breaking up long before Darwin, with the knowledge
that the earili is not tlle center of the universe but just
another celestial body. The job was, in theory at least,
completed by Darwin with the finding that human
beings are not the center or apex of creation but, rather,
members of a widely diverse animal community.
However, knowledge alone does not mean abandonment of an entrenched wOrldview. Sometimes this
process takes centuries.
While the moral ideal under the new ethics and the
emerging post-modern paradigm would be to cease all
non-therapeutic or coercive research on captive
nonhuman animals, the four "R's" at least point us in
this direction. At the same time, some of the proposed
alternatives, while using scientific rather tllan religious
descriptions of human and nonhuman animals, are still
somewhat anthropocentric in that they argue for the just
and moral treatment of certain species of nonhuman
animals, in particular mammals, because they have
many characteristics in common with us.
As the "universe bends toward justice," if in fact
iliis is happening, one can only hope that our concept
of moral community will grow and become more
inclusive. This new worldview is also going to force
people to reexamine their attitudes toward other animals
as sources of food, clothing, amusement and tethered
companionship as well. Albert Schweitzer once said
that we are not truly civilized if we concern ourselves
only with the relation of humans to other humans. What
is important is the relation of humans to all life. 43
Perhaps someday the new paradigm iliat will eventually
replace the traditional paradigm will be similar to that
espoused by Albert Schweitzer and Mahatma Gandhi
and be based on respect for all living beings regardless
of their resemblance to humans.
Until that time, the growing concern for the welfare
and rights of nonhuman animals manifested in laws such
as the Animal Welfare Act and in policy statements of
such groups as the National Institute of Health (1985),
the Council for International Organizations of Medical
Science (1985), and other professional groups are surely
steps in the right direction and, as such, are to be
applauded.

5. Conclusion

It is only by reference to religious myilis and paradigms
that we can justify a strict moral separation of humans
and other animals. Science does not provide the criteria
for such a division. As Mary Midgley points out:
"Animals are not just one of the tllings with which
people amuse iliemselves, like chewing-gum and water
skis, they are the group to which people belong. We are
not just ratller like animals; we are animals."42
The traditional pre-Darwinian paradigm holds that
our species, as well as other species, have an
immutable nature fixed by God. This paradigm has
been used to justify ilie belief, which is still prevalent
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